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Antiracism in Action
Daniel Harawa* & Brandon Hasbrouck**
Abstract
Racism pervades the criminal legal system, influencing
everything from who police stop and search, to who prosecutors
charge, to what punishments courts apply. The Supreme Court’s
fixation on colorblind application of the Constitution gives
judges license to disregard the role race plays in the criminal
legal system, and all too often, they do. Yet Chief Judge Roger L.
Gregory challenges the facially race-neutral reasoning of
criminal justice actors, often applying ostensibly colorblind
scrutiny to achieve a color-conscious jurisprudence. Nor is he
afraid of engaging directly in a frank discussion of the racial
realities of America, rebuking those within the system who would
treat Blackness as synonymous with crime. Judge Gregory’s
jurisprudence can—and frequently does—serve as a model for
judges in other circuits who are working to enact the vision of a
color-conscious Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
In America, race and criminal punishment go
hand-in-glove. From its inception, the American criminal legal
system has been a powerful tool in creating and maintaining a
racial hierarchy.1 Today, race plays a critical role at every
pressure point in the system—from policing, to indigent defense,
to prosecution, to sentencing.2
If courts are to have any role in addressing the entrenched
racial disparities in the criminal legal system, then judges must,
at a minimum, be willing to take into account the role that race
plays in the administration of justice. For that reason, we have
called for “color-conscious” judges who are willing to “account for
the differences in the experience of Black and white Americans
with police, prosecutors, and juries.”3 And we have advocated for
judges to adopt an antiracist approach to criminal law, which
contemplates how the government has “used its power to punish
as a means to subordinate Black people.”4 If we as a society are

1.
See, e.g., Bryan Stevenson, A Presumption of Guilt: The Legacy of
America’s History of Racial Injustice, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 3, 3–30
(Angela J. Davis ed., 2017) (highlighting that racism in the criminal legal
system has been a legacy in the United States ever since the abolition of
slavery); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 20–23 (2012) (asserting that the criminal legal
system has been used to disenfranchise people of color since the abolition of
slavery and Jim Crow laws).
2. See Nadia Woods, The Presence of Racial Disparities at Every
Decisional Phase of the Criminal Legal System, 26 PUB. INT. L. REP. 1, 1 (2020)
Racial disparity, in the context of the criminal legal system, refers to the
phenomena of a racial or ethnic group’s proportion within the control of the
system being greater than the proportion of such groups in the general
population. These disparities, such as Black people only making up
approximately 13% of the U.S. population but comprising nearly half the
population of currently incarcerated people, have long infected every step of
the criminal justice process.
3. Brandon Hasbrouck, Pack the Court with Color-Conscious Justices,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/9JML-JLCY.
4. Daniel S. Harawa, Black Redemption, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 701, 719
(2021).
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truly going to reckon with race,5 then the judiciary must be a
part of that reckoning.
Although we came to these ideas separately, it’s no surprise
since we both clerked for a judge who emulates the kind of judge
we want to see on the bench. Chief Judge Roger L. Gregory’s
presence on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit is in and of itself groundbreaking. When President Bill
Clinton installed Judge Gregory on the bench as a recess
appointment—which President George W. Bush followed up
with a lifetime appointment—Judge Gregory desegregated the
last all-white federal appellate court in the country.6 As
President Clinton remarked when appointing Judge Gregory:
“It is unconscionable that the Fourth Circuit, with the largest
African-American population of any circuit in our Nation, has
never had an African-American appellate judge.”7 Judge
Gregory’s presence on the bench remedied that wrong, and in
the process, burnished the path for other judges of color to serve
on the Fourth Circuit.8
The symbolism of Judge Gregory’s appointment to the
Fourth Circuit is valuable. But Judge Gregory has done so much
more than serve as a symbol. In his twenty years on the bench,
Judge Gregory has been a shining example of the importance of

5. See, e.g., Ibrahim X. Kendi, Is This the Beginning of the End of
American Racism?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2020), https://perma.cc/EF6L-QXHA
(asserting that Donald Trump “revealed the depths of the country’s
prejudice— and has inadvertently forced a reckoning”).
6. See Willie J. Epps, Jr., An Interview with Judge Gregory, ABA (Nov.
8, 2018), https://perma.cc/QR86-UKS8 (“I owe so much gratitude to President
Clinton for making the recess appointment and President George W. Bush for
making the lifetime appointment.”).
7. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Recess Appointment of Roger L.
Gregory to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and an
Exchange with Reporters, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2783, 2783 (Dec. 27, 2000),
https://perma.cc/RBM2-P9NZ. President Clinton had previously nominated
Judge Gregory to the Fourth Circuit, but the Senate did not act on his
nomination. See Presidential Nomination 1129, Roger L. Gregory, 106th
Congress (1999–2000), https://perma.cc/RFX6-MRZU.
8. Since Judge Gregory’s appointment, three African-American judges
and one Latino judge have served on the Fourth Circuit. See Examining the
Demographic Compositions of U.S. Circuit and District Courts, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/R5TC-GRY7 (stating that as of
February of 2020, the court includes two African-American judges and one
Hispanic judge).
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judicial diversity. He certainly has not taken his historic
appointment for granted.
As Sherrilyn Ifill once explained, many tout the value of
judicial diversity by relying on the fact that judges of color can
serve as role models and help increase public confidence in the
judiciary.9 Judge Gregory checks both boxes. He has been an
important role model to those who previously may not have seen
themselves reflected in the judiciary—including to us both. And
hopefully the public takes solace every time the judiciary comes
closer to reflecting the broader population. But Judge Gregory’s
value is much deeper than that. Because as then-Professor Ifill
went on to explain, we must look beyond the symbolism of
diverse judges when calling for judicial diversity and recognize
that diversity is valuable to the development of the law.10 It is
here where Judge Gregory shines brightest. His unique
perspective has enriched the Fourth Circuit’s decision-making.
In every case, he “bring[s] traditionally excluded perspectives”
to the fore and centers the experience of the litigants.11
In the criminal context, this means that Judge Gregory has
not shied away from the racial realities underlying much of
criminal jurisprudence. Quite the opposite. He has written
pointedly and poignantly about race and how it effects the
administration of justice.12 Judge Gregory’s criminal
jurisprudence is sensitive to the real-world effect that the court’s
rulings have on all people, particularly those who have
historically been excluded from the legal discourse and whose
lives are simultaneously disproportionately touched by the
criminal legal system. His jurisprudence seeks to fulfill the

9. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role
Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 405 (2000)
(explaining that “[t]raditional arguments” for appointing diverse judges
emphasize “the ‘role model’ value of black judges and the need for black judges
to help promote ‘public confidence’”).
10. Id. at 409–12.
11. Id. at 417; see Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judicial Diversity, 13 GREEN BAG 2D
45, 49 (2009) (arguing that “diversity on the courts enriches judicial
decisionmaking [and] that the interplay of perspectives of judges from diverse
backgrounds and experiences makes for better judicial decisionmaking,
especially on our appellate courts”).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 332 (4th Cir. 2020)
(Gregory, C.J., concurring) (describing the “long history of black and brown
communities feeling unsafe in police presence”).
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promise that undergirds the Constitution and is etched into the
portico of the Supreme Court: equal justice under law.13
While his body of work is far too expansive to capture in one
essay, and its importance extends far beyond just criminal law,
we will highlight two areas of Judge Gregory’s criminal
jurisprudence that evince his commitment to equal justice for all
people. Part I will explore Judge Gregory’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. While legal scholars have long criticized the
Supreme Court for ignoring race in its Fourth Amendment
cases,14 Judge Gregory has deployed the Supreme Court’s
precedents in a way that ensures that the Fourth Amendment
will protect all citizens, particularly Black and Brown ones. Part
II will explore Judge Gregory’s jurisprudence surrounding
remedies and explain how access to the courts is a racial justice
issue. Here, Judge Gregory innovates to guarantee that there is
a legal mechanism available to right constitutional wrongs,
proving that justice for all is his judicial north star.
Back in 2000, Roger L. Gregory’s nomination to the
conservative all-white Fourth Circuit promised to be
transformative.15 He did not disappoint.
I.

THE BLACK FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
notoriously colorblind. Legal luminaries have explored the
13. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (“The Constitution created
a government dedicated to equal justice under law.”); Building Features, SUP.
CT. U.S., https://perma.cc/2N8X-Y927 (discussing the architecture of the
Court).
14. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 331, 362 (1998) (tracing the Court’s failure to recognize race in Fourth
Amendment cases); Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 245, 246–47 (2010) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s “willful
blindness to race”); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth
Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1145 (2012) (discussing how implicit biases
affect police decisions to stop and search an individual).
15. See Anne E. Marimow, There’s a Word that No Longer Describes the
Federal Appeals Court in Richmond, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/MWN5-SWHT (“A portfolio of Southern cases, genteel
courtroom traditions and years of forceful conservative rulings shape the
enduring image of the federal appeals court in Richmond.”); Epps, supra note
6 (asking Judge Gregory what it was like to be the “first African American to
serve on what was then widely viewed as the most conservative of all the
Federal Circuit Courts”).
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doctrinal harms that flow from the Court’s erasure of race in its
Fourth Amendment precedents. 16 For instance, Professor Devon
Carbado asserted that the Court’s “investment in
colorblindness” has resulted in a “racial allocation of the
burdens and benefits of the Fourth Amendment” whereby
“people of color are burdened more by, and benefit less from, the
Fourth Amendment than whites.”17 What this means in the real
world, scholars elaborated, is that the Court’s Fourth
Amendment cases, among other ills, “facilitate[] racial
profiling”18 and exacerbate “police attention and harassment of
minorities.”19 Some may say that the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment precedent is a starting point for the racial
disparities that run the course of the legal punishment process.
What the scholarship hasn’t adequately illuminated is the
fact that there are judges like Roger Gregory who are doing the
most (in a good way) with the least. While the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence is mostly colorblind, Judge Gregory’s is not.20 He
has successfully deployed the Supreme Court’s colorblind cases
in a way that recognizes and protects the rights of minorities.21
Take, for example, the fortuitously named United States v.
Black.22 The facts of Black are worth recounting in detail.23
Police were idling at a gas station one night in a “high crime”
neighborhood in Charlotte, North Carolina, when they saw a
Black man sitting in his car for about three minutes. According
to the officers, a person sitting in his car for three minutes

16. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 14, at 375–79 (discussing Fourth
Amendment issues stemming from the Court’s decision in Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)); Butler, supra note 14, at 246–47 (stating that the
Court’s “willful blindness to race” has expanded “the power of the police
against people of color, especially blacks and Latinos”); Richardson, supra note
14, 1145 (explaining that the objective “reasonable suspicion” standard has
allowed police to stop-and-frisk minorities at higher rates than whites).
17. Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 946, 968–69 (2002).
18. Frank Rudy Cooper, Post-Racialism and Searches Incident to Arrest,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 117 (2012).
19. Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing,
and Race, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1543, 1592 (2019).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II.
22. 707 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2013).
23. All facts are recounted from id. at 534–36.
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without getting out to pump gas or go in the store was not only
“unusual,” but indicative of drug activity. The police ran the
plates. Nothing turned up. They followed the man to the parking
lot of a nearby apartment complex. There, the driver of the car
joined a group of five other Black men, one of whom was
Nathaniel Black. The officers also recognized one of the men as
having an arrest record. The officers called for backup so they
could make “voluntary contact.”
As they walked up, one man motioned to the officers that he
was carrying a gun, which he was legally permitted to carry. For
the officers, this triggered “the rule of two,” meaning that “if the
police find one firearm, there will most likely be another firearm
in the immediate area.” Apparently further piquing the officers’
suspicions, as they approached, Mr. Black voluntarily offered up
his ID while the other people in the group were
“argumentative”—to the police, Mr. Black’s compliance was
“unusual.” Rather than give Mr. Black back his ID, an officer
pinned it to his uniform. The officers then started to frisk the
men in the group, and at that point, Mr. Black announced he
was going home. An officer stopped him, told him that he was
not free to leave, and when Mr. Black tried to break free
anyways, police tackled him, handcuffed him, and discovered
that he had a gun.
In holding that the stop violated Mr. Black’s Fourth
Amendment rights, Judge Gregory reprimanded the federal
government for its “misuse of innocent facts as indicia of
suspicious activity.”24 He then picked apart the government’s
arguments one by one, making clear he would take any alleged
infringement upon a person’s constitutional rights seriously,
and pay close attention to any arguments hinting at the unequal
protection of minority citizens.
First, Judge Gregory rejected as “absurd” the government’s
argument that it was suspicious for a driver to sit in his car for
three minutes at a gas station.25 He then dismantled the idea
that someone in a group of people having an arrest record
justifies suspicion of the entire group, emphasizing that the
Fourth Amendment requires suspicion to be individualized.26

24.
25.
26.

Id. at 539.
Id.
Id. at 540.
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The police’s “rule of two” was equally problematic, Judge
Gregory reasoned, and found it to be an “abdication” of the
judicial role to accept this seemingly “arbitrary and boundless
rule as a basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”27
Judge Gregory’s handling of the government’s next set of
arguments reflects his careful attunement to issues of race.
When the government argued that police had reason to be
suspicious based on the fact one of the men was openly carrying
a gun, Judge Gregory made clear that once North Carolina
decided to allow the open carry of guns, that law applied
“uniformly” to everyone, thus police cannot automatically
assume a person carrying a gun is committing a crime.28 The
government tried to argue that even if that’s so, it was unusual
for people in this area to legally carry guns (e.g., Black people),
but Judge Gregory refused to give his “imprimatur” to that sort
of “dichotomy” in Fourth Amendment protections.29
Judge Gregory excoriated the government’s reliance on Mr.
Black’s over compliance with the police as justification for
suspicion, explaining that if Mr. Black had not acquiesced, then
police would have said that was suspicious.30 Judge Gregory
homed in on the catch-22 that accepting this argument would
put Black people in:
In certain communities that have been subject to
overbearing or harassing police conduct, cautious parents may
counsel their children to be respective, compliant, and
accommodating to police officers, to do everything officers
instruct them to do. If police officers can justify unreasonable
seizures on a citizen’s acquiescence, individuals would have no
Fourth Amendment protections unless they interact with
officers with the perfect amount of graceful disdain.31
Finally, although police often rely on the fact someone is in
a “high crime neighborhood” to justify their suspicion, Judge
Gregory was quick to cut the argument down, explaining that
“high crime neighborhoods” are often populated by racial

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 540–41.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
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minorities.32 “To conclude that mere presence in a high crime
area at night is sufficient justification for detention by law
enforcement is to accept carte blanche the implicit assertion
that Fourth Amendment protections are reserved only for a
certain race or class of people. We denounce such an assertion.”33
Lest there was any doubt that Judge Gregory was
affirmatively wrapping the cloak of the Fourth Amendment’s
protections around racial minorities, particularly Black people,
who are too often left out in the cold, he closed with this:
The facts of this case give us cause to pause and ponder the
slow systematic erosion of Fourth Amendment protections for a
certain demographic. In the words of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., we are reminded that ‘we are tied together in a single
garment of destiny, caught in an inescapable network of
mutuality,’ that our individual freedom is inextricably bound to
the freedom of others. Thus, we must ensure that the Fourth
Amendment rights of all individuals are protected.34
Black is all about Black people having equal Fourth
Amendment rights. This should be uncontroversial. Yet because
so few decisions explicitly discuss race in the Fourth
Amendment context, Black has had reverberating effects.
Judges across the country have cited it for the proposition that
presence in a high crime neighborhood, often synonymous with
Black and Brown neighborhoods, is insufficient to give rise to
reasonable suspicion.35 They have cited it for the idea that
32. Id. at 542.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See United States v. Gross, 784 F.3d 784, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Brown,
J., concurring) (citing Black to support the assertion that police “playing the
odds” by looking for people with guns in high crime neighborhoods is not the
same thing as reasonable suspicion); State v. Gordon, 846 N.W.2d 483, 489
(Wis. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Black to explain why courts must be particularly
careful to ensure a high crime area factor is not used with respect to entire
neighborhoods or communities); Commonwealth v. Crisostomo, No. 2013-SCC0008-CRM, 2014 WL 7072149, at *4 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 12, 2014) (“[B]eing out
and about late at night is not enough to create reasonable suspicion.”); Johnson
v. State, No. 2465, 2018 WL 5977917, at *4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 14, 2018)
(Arthur, J., concurring) (“Others have pointed out that the term ‘high-crime
area’ is not only amorphous and undefined, but that it can be used as a proxy
for race and ethnicity.”); State v. Evans, No. 2020AP286-CR, 2021 WL 279105,
at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2021) (analogizing Black’s admonition against
reliance on high crime areas to the related context of high crime times of day).

1036

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027 (2021)

carrying a gun in an open carry state cannot give rise to
reasonable suspicion—in essence, Black people are allowed to
exercise their Second Amendment rights too.36 And, relying on
Black, judges have recognized that because of their different
experiences Black people are taught to interact differently with
law enforcement from a young age.37 By scrutinizing rather than
simply accepting police action and government rationales that
have a targeted effect on Black and Brown people, and then
forcefully rejecting them, Judge Gregory’s decision in Black
shows what a judge committed to racial justice can do with
doctrine that legal scholars have conventionally read as being
harmful to minorities.
Another example of the power of Judge Gregory’s
jurisprudence is that he gives voice to perspectives too often
excluded from the dialogue. It is not often that judicial opinions
talk openly and honestly about the strained relationship Black
and Brown people frequently have with policing. This important
lived experience has, for the most part, been judicially
whitewashed from the Federal Reporter. Judge Gregory’s
concurrence in United States v. Curry38 breaks this mold.
Curry involved the use of “predictive policing.”39 There,
Richmond, Virginia police were patrolling Creighton Court, a
36. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th
Cir. 2015) (“Where it is lawful to possess a firearm, unlawful possession ‘is not
the default status.’”); Pulley v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 520, 526–27 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2016) (“In states in which possession of an unconcealed firearm is
legal, the mere observation or report of an unconcealed firearm cannot,
without more, generate reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and the
temporary seizure of that firearm.”); Kilburn v. State, 297 So. 3d 671, 674 n.2
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (collecting cases); People v. Wilson, 167 N.E.3d 182,
190–91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (“Suspicion and presumption of illegality are no
longer the default for officer observation of gun possession on private
property.”).
37. See United States v. Knights, 989 F.3d 1281, 1297 n.8 (11th Cir. 2021)
(Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (describing “The Talk” Black parents generally
have with their children about how to interact with law enforcement so that
no officer will have any reason to misperceive them as a threat).
38. 965 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
39. Id. at 347 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). “‘Predictive Policing Technology’
(“PPT”) is software programming that analyzes large sets of crime data to
identify the most likely locations, perpetrators, and victims of future crime.”
Margo McGehee, Recent Development, Predictive Policing Technology: Fourth
Amendment and Public Policy Concerns, U. CINCINNATI L. REV. (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://perma.cc/NVH3-6HJE.
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majority-Black neighborhood, as part of a “focus mission team”
in response to recent shootings.40 The officers heard gunshots,
responded to the area where they believed the shots came from,
and saw five to eight people walking away in different directions
in a nearby field.41 The officers approached the people in the
field, stopped them, and asked them to show their hands and
waistbands.42 Billy Curry complied in what police deemed to be
a “lackadaisical manner,” so they frisked him and found a gun.43
A majority of the en banc Fourth Circuit held that this stop and
frisk violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers
lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Curry
was involved in any crime.44
It is the separate opinions where things get interesting.
While six of the Fourth Circuit judges joined a principal dissent,
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson decided to file his own solo dissent.45
In it, Judge Wilkinson opens with a discussion of “two
Americas.”46 Given the dynamics of the case, one would assume
that he would go on to talk about the fact that Black and Brown
people often have very different experiences with law
enforcement than white people. But no. Instead, in Judge
Wilkinson’s view, there is “one America, where citizens possess
the means to hire private security or move to safer
neighborhoods” in response to “judicial barriers to effective law
enforcement,” and the other, where “people have no choice but
to endure the unintended consequences of our missteps, as
crime moves to fill the vacuum left by the progressive
40. Curry, 965 F.3d at 316.
41. Id. at 316–17.
42. Id. at 317.
43. Id. at 317 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Curry, No.
3:17CR130, 2018 WL 1384298, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2018)).
44. See id. at 331 (affirming the district court’s order). The Fourth
Circuit’s holding is particularly noteworthy because it used to be the most
conservative court of appeals. See Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are
Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45
L. & SOC’Y REV. 171, 171 (2011) (recounting that a 2003 New York Times article
referred to the Fourth Circuit as “the shrewdest, most aggressively
conservative federal appeals court in the nation” (quoting Deborah Sontag,
The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 9, 2003),
https://perma.cc/WV3W-AUQY)).
45. Curry, 965 F.3d at 315.
46. Id. at 346 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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disablement of the law’s protections.”47 Judge Wilkinson
believed that decisions like Curry “risk inducing police officers
to simply abandon inner cities as part of their mission,” leaving
“the least fortunate among us” to “fend increasingly for
themselves.”48 Judge Wilkinson feared that a combination of
rising crime and the “lack of respect shown by courts for even
good policework” would result in “an America where gated
communities will be safe enough and dispossessed communities
will be left to fend increasingly for themselves.”49
Judge Gregory wrote a separate concurrence to respond. He
embraced the idea that there are in fact two Americas, but
explained, citing Frederick Douglass’s What to the Slave Is the
Fourth of July?, that really, that dividing line is often race.50
Judge Gregory educated his colleague on the fact that “[t]here’s
a long history of black and brown communities feeling unsafe in
police presence,”51 and that increased police presence designed
to fight crime often brings increased “peril[],” “what has been
described as ‘a central paradox of the African American
experience: the simultaneous over- and under-policing of
crime.’”52 Judge Gregory elaborated that Judge Wilkinson’s
“exegesis” ignores “the concerns of some that any encounter with
an officer could turn fatal.”53
Judge Gregory paid homage to some of the Black people who
had recently been killed by police. He advised that for Black
people, who society may deem
dangerous even when they are in their living rooms eating
ice cream, asleep in their beds, playing in the park, standing
in the pulpit of their church, birdwatching, exercising in
public, or walking home from a trip to the store to purchase
a bag of Skittles, it is still within their own

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 348–49.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 332 (Gregory, C.J., concurring).
Id.
See id. (quoting JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 35 (2017)).
53. Id. at 331–32.
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“disadvantaged”—that they feel the most secure.54
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Judge Gregory emphasized that it is arguments like that
made by Judge Wilkinson, borne from the idea that they
(privileged white people) need to “save minority or
disadvantaged communities from themselves,” that create a
“Hobson’s choice for these communities: decide between their
constitutional rights against unwarranted searches and
seizures or forgo governmental protection that is readily
afforded to other communities.”55 Judge Gregory ended by
turning Judge Wilkinson’s words on their head, concluding that
the “‘lifelines a fragile community retains against physical harm
and mental despair,’ must be the assurance that there truly is
equal protection under law.”56
Judge Gregory’s rebuke of Judge Wilkinson’s views and
frank discussion of the complicated realities of race and policing
drew national attention.57 Judge Gregory thereby again exposed
the unfortunate fact that honest discussions of race too often do
not make it into judicial opinions.58 But as Judge Gregory
continues to chart this path and have these tough but necessary
discussions, hopefully more judges will follow suit. With Judge
Gregory on the bench, we’ve come a little closer to the
Constitution applying equally to everyone.

54. Id. at 332.
55. Id. at 332–33.
56. Id. at 334 (quoting id. at 349 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting)).
57. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Black Judge Has to Explain to White
Colleague Why Racial Profiling Is Bad, SLATE (July 16, 2020, 5:46 PM),
https://perma.cc/7FGR-Y26C (noting that “[t]he task fell on [Judge] Gregory to
enlighten his colleague about the realities of racist policing”); Debra Cassens
Weiss, 4th Circuit Spars Over Predictive Policing; Dissenter Criticized for
Writing ‘With a Smooth Pen and a Tin Ear’, ABA J. (July 16, 2020, 2:45 PM),
https://perma.cc/9FCY-7XCT (describing Judge Gregory’s concurrence);
Jacqueline Thomsen, Judges Rebuke Colleague Over Stance on Unfair Policing
of Blacks, NAT’L L.J. (July 15, 2020, 7:26 PM), https://perma.cc/W9CQ-62C9
(same).
58. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Supreme Court Is Avoiding Talking About
Race, ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/77EV-JM89 (explaining that
“[i]t is extraordinarily rare for [Supreme Court] justices—again, except for
Sotomayor—to reference race or racism in cases involving police stops”).
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REMEDIES AND RACIAL JUSTICE

The antiracist nature of Judge Gregory’s jurisprudence is
especially apparent in his approach to remedies for
constitutional violations by police, prosecutors, and judges in
criminal proceedings. His jurisprudence emphasizes the need
for a strong writ of habeas corpus, cautious application of
qualified immunity, and a searching inquiry into the
substantive reasonableness of sentences. Even when he does not
draw attention to the racial implications of a decision, Judge
Gregory’s awareness of them consistently shapes his opinions.
This is especially important considering the way courts have so
often used procedural limitations on remedies to dispose of the
claims of Black litigants.59
Judge Gregory emphasized the need for a strong writ of
habeas corpus in his dissent from the court’s opinion in United
States v. Surratt.60 At the outset, he laid out the stakes of the
case: “Raymond Surratt will die in prison because of a sentence
that the government and the district court agree is undeserved
and unjust.”61 While Surratt’s sentence—life imprisonment—
was within the sentencing guideline range for his offense, the
district court in his initial trial erroneously believed that no
lesser sentence was available under the statute.62 The majority
refused to grant habeas relief because the district court did not
illegally impose a death sentence, but Judge Gregory called
attention to the weakness of this reasoning, as life
imprisonment is functionally a death sentence by slower
means.63

59. See, e.g., United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 274 (4th Cir. 2015)
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s procedural argument that
the Black petitioner’s claim was barred because he “should have brought a
§ 2255 motion raising his Simmons claim even before Simmons existed”).
60. 797 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2015); see id. at 270–71 (Gregory, J., dissenting)
(describing the writ of habeas corpus as an “equitable remedy” that is “central
to our justice system”).
61. Id. at 269 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
62. See id. (“The district court sentenced Surratt to life in prison only
because it thought it was required to do so pursuant to a statutory mandatory
minimum. As it turns out, the correct statutory range for Surratt’s crime was
a minimum of twenty years, and a maximum of life.”).
63. See id. at 270 (“It leaves him to spend the rest of his life in prison; a
death sentence of a different kind.”).
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Strikingly, the government agreed with Surratt that his
sentence was inappropriate in light of the Fourth Circuit’s
retroactively-applicable decision in United States v. Simmons,64
where the court decided which state law felonies qualified as
predicate felony drug offenses under the Controlled Substances
Act.65 Other circuits are split on whether the savings clause can
apply when subsequent cases clarify that a sentence is above the
legal maximum.66 Judge Gregory argued for more: even a
sentence at the legal maximum could be challenged when the
trial court clearly would not have imposed the sentence in the
absence of now-overturned precedents.67 His reasoning turns on
the interaction between the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)
and the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution.68
Section 2255 provides an alternative means for testing the
legality of convictions and sentences, having been introduced to
relieve the heavy dockets of district courts near federal
prisons.69 The traditional habeas remedy is meant to remain
available through the savings clause when a motion is
insufficient to challenge the legality of a conviction or

64. 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
65. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–14. See Surratt, 797 F.3d at 270 (“[W]e corrected our
mistaken understanding of just what constitutes a qualifying felony for federal
sentencing purposes in United States v. Simmons. Both parties agree that
under our retroactively-applicable Simmons decision, Surratt possesses only
one CSA predicate felony.”) (internal citations omitted).
66. See Brandon Hasbrouck, Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall
Within the Savings Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 108 GEO. L.J. 287, 291–92
(2019) (“The Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits routinely deny relief
to federal prisoners seeking habeas relief in the form of resentencing . . . The
Sixth and Seventh Circuits have concluded that some sentencing errors can be
addressed under the savings clause.”).
67. See Surratt, 797 F.3d at 270 (“Given this mistake that the parties
agree is of constitutional magnitude, the parties further agree that Surratt is
entitled to relief from the very sentence that the district court unambiguously
stated it would not have imposed absent the erroneous statutory mandatory
minimum.”).
68. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.”).
69. See Surratt, 797 F.3d at 271 (“The impetus for § 2255 was that federal
courts located near prisons had become overwhelmed by petitions from
prisoners who, until that point, were required by § 2241 to apply for writs in
the district of their confinement.”).
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sentence.70 This fallback mechanism ensures that § 2255, with
all its limitations, does not violate the Suspension Clause.71
While Congress retains the power to prescribe mandatory
sentences with no judicial discretion, it did not do so under the
Controlled Substances Act for defendants situated as Surratt
was.72 Denying Surratt the opportunity to challenge his
sentence would compound the initial error that led the district
court to believe that no sentence other than life imprisonment
was available. This would be a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.73 The majority penalized Surratt for not bringing the
challenge to the classification of state-law felonies that revealed
the flaw in his conviction.74 Judge Gregory also took issue with
the majority’s hand-wringing that allowing challenges under
the savings clause might lead to a deluge of such challenges;
only a handful of prisoners were similarly situated.75 He cuts to
the core of the majority’s opinion and takes it to task for “picking
and choosing whatever rules it wishes to apply to § 2255(e) from
other parts of our habeas jurisprudence.”76
While the dissent is highly technical, Judge Gregory’s
conclusion is a powerful condemnation of the use of such
procedural trickery to buttress the carceral state. In the face of

70. See id. at 271 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“In this way, § 2255 ‘replaced
traditional habeas corpus for federal prisoners . . . with a process that allowed
the prisoner to file a motion with the sentencing court.’” (citing Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774 (2008))).
71. See id. (“As the Supreme Court recognizes, the savings clause ensures
that subsequently enacted-limitations in § 2255 do not run afoul of the
Suspension Clause.”).
72. See id. at 273 (“For someone like Surratt, with only one qualifying
felony drug offense, Congress intended to permit a district court to assign a
sentence somewhere in the range of twenty years to life. It did not mandate
only a life sentence.”).
73. See id. (“The majority arrives at this constitutionally-suspect outcome
by departing from the traditional savings clause analysis.”).
74. See id. at 274 (“The majority protests, however, that Surratt should
have brought a § 2255 motion raising his Simmons claim even before Simmons
existed.”).
75. See id. at 275 (“Far from opening the floodgates, as the majority
suggests, such an approach may provide relief to those who continue to serve
life sentences despite not possessing the requisite number of predicate felony
offenses under Simmons, which is all of eight prisoners in the Western District
of North Carolina.”).
76. Id. at 275–76.
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the majority’s abdication of its responsibility to the
administration of justice, he recognizes that Surratt must rely
on the mercy of the executive branch.77 He presents the case as
a fundamental test of the court’s values, and one which it has
failed:
To hope for the right outcome in another’s hands perhaps is
noble. But only when we actually do the right thing can we be
just. I lament that today we are not the latter. Neither the plain
language of our habeas statutes, our precedent, nor the
Constitution demands that Surratt die in prison. I must
dissent.78
Fortunately, the executive branch did the right thing,
commuting Surratt’s sentence and mooting his appeal.79 Judge
Wynn’s forceful dissent from the later order dismissing Surratt’s
appeal as moot hints that he likely would have succeeded in the
absence of a commutation under the President’s pardon power.80
Judge Gregory’s reasoning would be explicitly adopted by the
Sixth Circuit81 before ultimately being adopted by the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Wheeler.82 As a result,
erroneously-applied mandatory minimum sentences may be
challenged through a writ of habeas corpus, even when the error

77. See id. at 276 (“It is within our power to do more than simply leave
Surratt to the mercy of the executive branch.”).
78. Id.
79. See United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 2017)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (en banc)
[Surratt] is also no longer serving a judicially imposed sentence, but
a presidentially commuted one. The President’s commutation order
simply closes the judicial door. Absent some constitutional infirmity
in the commutation order, which is not present here, we may not
readjust or rescind what the President, in the exercise of his pardon
power, has done.
80. See id. at 220–22 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (explaining that Surratt
would likely have been released because his “time-served exceed[ed] the upper
end of his now-applicable Guidelines range”).
81. See Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 599 (6th Cir. 2016) (“We
acknowledge the wisdom of Judge Gregory’s reasoning. Surveying the
authority of our sister circuits, which have split on the issue, we are persuaded
by the approach outlined in . . . Judge Gregory’s dissent in Surratt, now before
the Fourth Circuit en banc.”).
82. 886 F.3d 415, 433 (4th Cir. 2018). The court was not bound by the
prior panel’s decision in Surratt because of the grant of a rehearing en banc,
despite that appeal having been dismissed as moot. Id.
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is only revealed through later, retroactively-applicable
decisions.83
This commitment to the difficult details of the law also
shines through in Judge Gregory’s qualified immunity cases.
Police with itchy trigger fingers have often found that panels
including Judge Gregory are inclined to deny them a license to
kill.84 Among such cases, Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg
is especially noteworthy for its slow procedural crawl through
the courts.85 These cases require intense scrutiny of the relevant
facts and a healthy skepticism for officers’ justifications for their
actions, which Judge Gregory has demonstrated again and
again. But qualified immunity cases do much more than simply
restrain violent and reckless police officersofficial
misbehavior frequently surfaces in the casual racism of
everyday investigations.
Judge Gregory tackled the unreasonableness of racist
investigatory practices in Smith v. Munday.86 April Yvette
Smith was arrested without probable cause and held for eight
days on charges of possessing and selling crack cocaine.87

83. See Allen v. Ives, 976 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2020) (Fletcher, J.,
concurring) (denying a petition for a rehearing en banc of a decision allowing
a habeas challenge to a mandatory minimum sentence erroneously imposed
under since-retroactively-overturned precedent and noting that this is also the
law in the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits).
84. See, e.g., Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2011) (denying
qualified immunity to an officer who shot an unarmed man while intending to
use on a taser on him); Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 2020) (denying
qualified immunity to an officer who shot and killed a tethered dog while
serving a warrant); Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661,
663– 64 (4th Cir. 2020) (denying qualified immunity to officers who fatally shot
a Black man experiencing homelessness while he lay on the ground between
the officers and a stone wall).
85. See generally Estate of Jones, 961 F.3d 661; Estate of Jones v. City of
Martinsburg, 726 F. App’x. 173 (4th Cir. 2018); Estate of Jones v. Martinsburg,
655 F. App’x. 948 (4th Cir. 2016). Before ultimately settling, the case appeared
before the Fourth Circuit to settle the issue of qualified immunity after twice
coming before the panel on evidentiary issues. Estate of Jones, 961 F.3d; Estate
of Jones, 726 F. App’x 173.; Estate of Jones, 655 F. App’x 948. These opinions
also demonstrate Judge Gregory’s acute understanding on how civil procedure
can be weaponized in cases involving police use of deadly force. Estate of Jones,
961 F.3d 661; Estate of Jones, 726 F. App’x. 173; Estate of Jones, 655 F. App’x.
948.
86. 848 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2017).
87. Id. at 251.
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Officers sent a confidential informantwired with
malfunctioning audio and video recordersto purchase crack
cocaine.88 The informant reported that he purchased crack from
a Black woman in her forties named “April Smith.”89 Sometime
later, Officer Munday searched police databases for Black
women in Lincoln County named April Smith with criminal
records and discovered that April Yvette Smith had three prior
convictions for selling crack cocaine.90 Even though he had no
indication that the woman who sold crack to the confidential
informant had a criminal record, he considered Ms. Smith’s age,
race, gender, and prior record as proof enough of her guilt and
applied for an arrest warrant.91 He conducted no further
investigation, and did not attempt to resolve the conflict
between his confidential informant’s report that the woman who
sold him crack was “skinny” and the fact that Ms. Smith
weighed 160 pounds.92
Contrary to the district court’s conclusions, Judge Gregory
wrote that “a criminal history, common race, common gender,
and unfortunately common name is not enough to establish
probable cause.”93 Not only did Munday lack any reason to
believe that the woman who sold his confidential informant
crack lived in Lincoln County or had prior convictions, but even
his database search based on these faulty assumptions returned
multiple Black women named April Smith.94 Such thin evidence
cannot support a finding of probable cause, and if it did, “officers

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 251–52. While the use of first and last names alone to search
databases for a suspect might not have obvious racial implications on its face,
the relatively low number of surnames among non-white communities make
this practice especially pernicious when identifying Black people. See Naila S.
Awan, When Names Disappear: State Roll-Maintenance Practices, 49 U. MEM.
L. REV. 1107, 1122–23 (2019) (exploring the ways that the Crosscheck program
over-selected Black, Hispanic, and Asian voters in its purges through its
reliance on first and last name matches).
92. See Smith, 848 F.3d at 251–52. Ms. Smith alleged that she was even
heavier at the time the confidential informant purchased the drugs. Id. at 252.
93. Id. at 252.
94. See id. at 253 (“[W]hen [Munday] found multiple individuals, at least
two of whom were black women named April Smith . . . he chose one for no
immediately apparent reason.”).
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would have probable cause to obtain arrest warrants for any
local residents who fit the generic description of the day—be it
‘black woman,’ ‘black man,’ or otherwise—so long as they had a
criminal history and an unfortunately common name.”95 In the
absence of any evidence tying Ms. Smith in particular to the
scene of the crime, Munday’s application for an arrest warrant
lacked probable cause, and thus violated her Fourth
Amendment rights.96 Filling in the gaps with racist assumptions
could not magically render such a warrant application
reasonable, and therefore, Munday was not entitled to qualified
immunity.97 It might be easy for a court to condone such logical
shortcuts from law enforcement officers, but Judge Gregory
insists that they at least clear the low bar of reasonableness to
invoke the defense of qualified immunity.
Judge Gregory applies similar scrutiny to reviews of the
substantive reasonableness of sentencing decisions. In United
States v. Blue,98 he emphasized that, “[t]here is no mechanical
approach to our sentencing review.”99 Benjamin Blue “pled
guilty to armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during
a crime of violence.”100 He raised numerous arguments in favor
of a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines, but
the district court imposed a sentence at the low end of the
guidelines’ range without addressing Blue’s arguments.101
While a judge has discretion to reject such arguments, that
rejection requires an explanation when the arguments are
nonfrivolous.102
Blue raised six arguments in favor of a downward departure
from the sentencing guidelines:
1) the career offender Guideline range was overly harsh
and failed to deter offenders; 2) a within-Guidelines
95. Id. at 254.
96. See id. at 255.
97. See id. at 255–56 (“Qualified immunity does not apply ‘where the
warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence unreasonable.’” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986))).
98. 877 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2017).
99. Id. at 518.
100. Id. at 516.
101. See id. at 516–17.
102. See id. at 518–19.
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sentence was too severe in light of his co-defendant’s
63-month sentence; 3) he had a positive employment
record; 4) his family relationships had developed since
his prior robbery convictions; 5) he had accepted
responsibility; and 6) he had attempted (albeit
unsuccessfully) to assist in the prosecution of others.103
The district court’s failure to grapple with these arguments
rendered Blue’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.104
Nevertheless, the Government argued that the sentence should
stand because a within-guidelines sentence is entitled to a
presumption of reasonableness, Blue was given the opportunity
to argue for a downward variance from the guidelines, and the
court’s cursory statement that it considered arguments on
Blue’s behalf was sufficient.105 Judge Gregory rejected each of
these arguments in turn.
Judge Gregory rejected the first argument because the
presumption of reasonableness only applies to the substantive
prong of the analysis, while Blue challenged the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence.106 On the second argument,
Judge Gregory rejected the notion that the opportunity to make
arguments alone was sufficient to satisfy procedural
reasonableness.107 The court was required to “address[] and
explain[] the defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments prior to
sentencing.”108 As to the third, Judge Gregory rejected the
notion that merely acknowledging the defendant’s arguments
satisfied the district court’s duty to consider them.109 Without
direct discussion of the district court’s reasoning or sufficient
contextual evidence to infer it, an appellate court lacks the
necessary information to conduct a meaningful appellate review

103. Id. at 519.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 519–20.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 520.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 521 (explaining that the district court failed to explain how
the § 3553(a) factors shaped the decision, that the record fails to show that
“Blue was immune to other means of deterrence,” and that the district court
failed to “engage counsel in a discussion about the merits of Blue’s
arguments”).
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of that decision.110 Judge Gregory declined to engage in
speculation, instead remanding Blue’s case for a full exploration
of the relevant facts and arguments.111
Habeas corpus review, civil rights suits, and direct appeals
of procedurally unreasonable sentences are markedly different
remedies in both form and substance. Yet all are critical for
holding criminal justice actors accountable. Judge Gregory
consistently approaches all three with a common plan:
scrutinize the facts, thoroughly assess the controlling law, and
rigorously apply that law without undue deference to police,
prosecutors, or trial judges.
CONCLUSION
A democracy cannot thrive where power remains unchecked
and justice is reserved for a select few.
John Lewis112
Too often, courts allow the institutional racism of the
criminal legal system—and with it, much of the power of
police—to go unchecked.113 Race (and its close companion,
wealth) can be outcome-determinative in the criminal justice
context from the very fact of whether an encounter with police
occurs in the first place through the ultimate verdict and
sentence.114 The Supreme Court’s insistence on a colorblind
110. Id.
111. See id. (deciding that, since Blue’s sentence was procedurally
unreasonable, the Court was unable to review the sentence for substantive
reasonableness).
112. Ahmed Young, John Lewis’s Legacy Shows Path Forward, IND. LAW.
(Aug. 19, 2020), perma.cc/7AC5-SUC2 (quoting John Lewis, Remarks in
support of the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act (June 25, 2020)).
113. See Hasbrouck, supra note 3 (“[O]ur courts complicitly adopt
deferential rules for reviewing the misdeeds of police, prosecutors and
judges.”).
114. See Maclin, supra note 14, 333 (“In America, police targeting of black
people for excessive and disproportionate search and seizure is a practice older
than the Republic itself.”); THE SENT’G PROJ., REPORT OF THE SENTENCING
PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY
FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED
INTOLERANCE 3 (2018), https://perma.cc/U4N5-DCUD (PDF) (finding that
Black persons are arrested and convicted more often than whites, and then
they are sentenced more harshly than whites); Neil Bhutta et al., Disparities
in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, BD.
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constitution conveniently excuses judges who would prefer to
ignore the role of race in policing, prosecution, and
punishment.115 While much of Judge Gregory’s jurisprudence is
facially colorblind, his rigorous application of precedent to
scrutinize
government
action
is
substantively—and
powerfully—antiracist.
Overpolicing of Black and Brown communities often eludes
serious review through its reliance on lax application of
ostensibly colorblind precedent.116 The standard of
reasonableness will be credulously applied to police behavior
and decision-making, rendering challenges dead on arrival.117
The government’s invocation of procedural bars to relief will be
credited without serious inquiry.118 The facts of a case will be
carefully distinguished from precedent to avoid fitting police
behavior within the realm of firmly established law.119 When
judges resort to these dismissive techniques, Black and Brown
litigants quickly find themselves on the losing side of a case. By
refusing to abdicate the power and duty of judicial review in

OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS. (Sept. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/967ET84G (“New data from the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) show
that long-standing and substantial wealth disparities between families in
different racial and ethnic groups were little changed since the last survey in
2016 . . . .”).
115. See Carbado, supra note 17, at 1044 (“[The Supreme Court] carefully
enlists the ideology of colorblindness to elide the complexities of race. As a
result of this racial elision, people of color continue to experience the Fourth
Amendment more as a technology of surveillance than as a constitutional
provision . . . .”).
116. See Butler, supra note 16, at 247 (“The Fourth Amendment
accomplishes its racial project in three parts. First, the jurisprudence rarely
mentions race. Next, it grants extraordinary discretion to police and
prosecutors. Finally, it constructs the criminal as colored, and the white as
innocent.”).
117. See Yankah, supra note 19, at 1581 (“[T]he subjective motivation of a
police officer [is] irrelevant in determining the reasonableness of a Fourth
Amendment seizure.”).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 256 (4th Cir. 2015)
(reasoning that habeas relief could not be granted since the lower court did not
give an illegal sentence).
119. See, e.g., Michael P. O’Connor & Celia Rumman, Going, Going, Gone:
Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1234,
1259– 62 (2002) (relaying how a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review ignored Fourth Circuit precedent, instead distinguishing on the dates
of the underlying facts).
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criminal justice, Judge Gregory has shifted its application in the
Fourth Circuit in a markedly antiracist direction.

